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CAN WINE BE
BEAUTIFUL? 
A philosophical tradition stretching from Plato through Aquinas and Kant to
the present day relegates the senses of smell and taste. Christopher Grau and
Douglas MacLean deny any hierarchy of the senses, affirming that along
with art, literature, music, and nature, wine can indeed be beautiful
Taste, Hearing, and Touch, by Jan Brueghel the Elder, with Hendrick van Balen and others (17th century)
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companion.” Thus, “gustatory pleasure does not demand an
intellectual act,” and “if one man prefers claret to Burgundy
(or, to be more specific, Mouton to Latour), there is no
sense in which this disagreement can be resolved into 
some other, more basic one, without ceasing to be a
disagreement about the gustatory qualities of the wines.” 5
We find it rather amazing to hear these claims from a
philosopher who not only professes to love wine but also
believes that in drinking wine one is “actually tasting God.” 6
We have both a specific and a more general response to
this argument. First, the manifest lack of a complete
objective ordering in terms of goodness or aesthetic quality
does not imply that we are out of the realm of objective
standards and are dealing instead with mere subjective
differences of taste. That we cannot find objective
standards for determining in the end that Mouton is better
than Latour (or vice versa) is no different from our inability
to resolve disputes about whether Puccini is better than
Wagner, or Manet a greater painter than Vermeer. In wine,
as in art, we can still distinguish clearly between the great
and the second-rate, and we can explain the objective basis
for making these distinctions, even though experts will
continue to disagree about who is the greatest, and some
people will continue to prefer the second-rate.
Our more general comment is this. Let us put to one
side the representational aspects of literature or painting
and the kinds of potential of poetry or painting or music 
for expressing emotions that reach to the most profound
aspects of human life. Nobody wants to deny that these are
among the most important features of art and are
fundamental both to what we think is beautiful in these
areas and to our aesthetic judgments. But we also find
beauty in arts, crafts, and nature in ways that do not involve
these representational aspects of art but that also demand
attention and can inspire contemplation. 
Consider, therefore, that the senses of sound and sight
are both modes of experiencing the world. Each provides us
with a distinctive kind of awareness of the world and of
ourselves as creatures in it. Some things have the potential to
call attention to these modes of experience as such in most
agreeable ways. We are naturally struck with how utterly
pleasing some visual or auditory experiences can be in ways
that draw our appreciation to the objects that cause those
experiences, and to the features of those objects that are
particularly well suited to draw our attention and please us in
these particular ways: the patterns and colors of a Persian
rug, the sound of a bird or a simple melody, the colors of a
sunset, or the sound and sight of waves crashing on a beach.
These effects lead us to focus our attention on their objects,
and they provoke contemplative thoughts about the nature
of our experience and the kinds of creatures we are. In these
areas, of course, there is always a difficulty of distinguishing
the beautiful from the merely sentimental, and of
distinguishing what we are drawn to only because we find
the experience agreeable from what we are drawn to in ways
that count as appreciating the objects themselves. But we
often regard as beautiful those objects that have a strong
potential for focusing our attention in ways that inspire
wonder or awe toward both the objects themselves and our
modes of experiencing the world.
If objects that we see or hear can be beautiful in these
nonrepresentational ways, then we see no reason why
objects that we taste and smell cannot also be beautiful.
Taste, along with smell, is a complex mode of experiencing
the world. It establishes some of our most intimate
connections to the world, and it provides another basis for
reflecting on the kind of creature we are. We see no reason
in principle why the objects we access through this mode of
experience cannot make the same kinds of normative
claims on us as other beautiful objects that we access
through sight or sound.
Scruton is not alone in insisting on a distinction
between the higher and lower senses that also marks off the
beautiful from the merely agreeable. One finds a version of
this distinction in Kant, and it is echoed in contemporary
writers such as Elaine Scarry. 7 Our sympathies, however,
are with Sibley, who, upon reviewing claims about the
limitations of the lower senses, concludes: “If there is an
argument of weight here, it eludes me.” 8 In a recent article
on wine, Scruton (replying to Sibley) claims that smells
“cannot be organized as sounds are: Put them together and
they mingle, losing their character. […] They remain free-
floating and unrelated, unable to generate expectation,
tension, harmony, suspension, or release.” 9 This strikes us
as a rather desperate argument. Is it a flaw of painting that
brushstrokes mingle and lose their individual character, or
a flaw of a musical chord that the notes mingle and lose
their individual character? If we consider smell and taste
together, as we do in experiencing wine, then we find that
harmony and structure can spread out over time to create
the kind of complex experience that can lead us to an
appreciation of taste as such. Perhaps this is why Alexandre
Dumas called wine “the intellectual part of the meal.” 10
W I N E  A N D  B E A U T Y
A robust philosophical tradition tells us that
wine cannot be beautiful or a fit subject of
aesthetic judgment. The reason for this is that
our experience of wine comes primarily
through the senses of taste and smell, and
these “lower” senses do not allow for the kinds
of complex cognitive content that are made
possible in what we experience via the
“higher” senses of hearing and sight. Cognitive
content, this tradition tells us, is a necessary
condition of beauty or aesthetic judgment.
Even the finest wine offers only a different
kind of pleasure. 
Appealing only to the lower senses, wine does not
represent or express much of anything; it certainly does not
represent or express the most profound elements of the
human condition as painting, literature, or music
sometimes do. Wine cannot be beautiful. This traditional
view finds support in the writing of many great
philosophers, from Plato through Aquinas and Kant.
We find at least two problems with this view. First, no
sensible theory of beauty can demand complexity,
representation, or expression from all beautiful objects. A
simple melody, such as one finds in a birdsong or a folk
song, can be beautiful without being complex. The
simplicity of a modernist sculpture—for example, a
Brancusi—or the kind of decorative art one finds in
architecture or in pottery and rugs, can be beautiful
without being representational or very complex. We are
also convinced by Frank Sibley’s patient attempt to
demonstrate that taste and smell have the potential for a
significant amount of complexity. Sibley, of course,
mentions wine. 1
The argument against the lower senses might be based
on the claim that the senses of taste and smell, whether
simple or complex, cannot engage our cognitive capacities.
The objects that we perceive through taste and smell are in
this respect unlike beautiful objects that we perceive
through sight and sound. We are not convinced that wine
can be fully appreciated without engaging our cognitive
capacities in some way. Memory is certainly required in the
appreciation of wine, as may be some knowledge of where
the wine is produced and the constraints imposed on
production in different regions. But these are contentious
claims, and we don’t mean to make much of them here.
Rather, we wish to challenge the claim that engaging the
cognitive capacities is a necessary condition of the
beautiful. That condition would rule out quite a bit of
music and painting, and perhaps much of what most
people, including philosophers, find beautiful in nature.
We have not said what counts as “cognitive” in
experiencing beauty. Our point is that if the bar is set low
enough to include all music and painting that people tend
to agree is beautiful, then wine will also qualify; and if it is
set high enough to exclude wine, then it will rule out a lot of
music and painting, too.
The second problem with the tradition that is skeptical
of the possibility that taste and smell can give rise to beauty
is that this view does not fit very well with what many
people who love and understand wine say about it. Of
course, this fact alone does not settle any issues about
whether wine can be beautiful or an appropriate object of
aesthetic judgment. It is human nature to exaggerate the
importance of what we like. We recall, for example, Howard
Cosell referring to an American football game as a “world-
historical event.” Nor would we deny that wine enthusiasts
may be prone to rhapsodize to the point of ridiculousness
about their obsession. Nevertheless, many wine lovers are
also intelligent and eloquent writers, and we should take
seriously what they and their readers find natural ways to
talk and think about something that has an undeniably
special status among objects of appreciation throughout
history and across many cultures.
A hierarchy of the senses?
Before considering the qualities or marks of the beautiful
that do seem naturally to apply to wine, we want to
comment further on the distinction between higher and
lower senses. Aquinas most explicitly calls our attention to
this supposed difference. “[T]hose senses chiefly regard the
beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz sight and
hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful
sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other
objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
‘beautiful,’ for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and
beautiful odors.” Aquinas infers from this that if good
refers to what is pleasing to the appetite, then beauty “adds
to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty,” thus making
the beautiful “something pleasant to apprehend.” 2 Now this
is a rather cryptic remark, and Aquinas does not explain the
connection of beauty to the pleasure of apprehension.
Roger Scruton, perhaps the best-known contemporary
defender of Aquinas’s view, is also specially keen to apply 
it to wine. Thus, Scruton insists that it is “important to 
keep hold of the difference that Aquinas points to, in
distinguishing cognitive from non-cognitive senses,” 3
though he acknowledges elsewhere that “it is difficult to
describe the difference.” 4 He nonetheless attempts to
explain this distinction in a number of different ways,
claiming, for example, that aesthetic pleasure must draw
one’s attention to the object in the right way. “Vision and
hearing, unlike taste and smell, may sometimes be forms 
of objective contemplation. In tasting and smelling I
contemplate not the object but the experience derived
from it.” This difference leads Scruton to claim that
“although the connoisseur of wine may ‘attend to’ the
qualities of what he drinks, his pleasure, when he does so, 
is not of a different kind from that of his ignorant
That we cannot find objective
standards for determining in
the end that Mouton is better
than Latour (or vice versa) is 
no different from our inability
to resolve disputes about
whether Puccini is better than
Wagner, or Manet a greater
painter than Vermeer
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lower sense, suitable only for agreeable or pleasant
experience, Scruton claims that “gustatory pleasure does not
demand an intellectual act.” But other wine enthusiasts,
impressed by the complexity and nature of great wine,
simply disagree. Thus, Jancis Robinson MW says that “one
sniff and sip” of a truly fine wine makes you realize “that wine
is capable of reaching not just your throat and nose but your
brain, your heart, and occasionally your soul too.” 18 Fadiman
insists that wine summons up “powers of discrimination
[that] evince curiosity or a desire to learn. I know of no other
liquid that, placed in the mouth, forces one to think.” 19
These are quotes from wine lovers who speak
authoritatively about wine and the experience of drinking it.
These quotes are easy to find in the literature, and these ways
of talking about wine, far from being pretentious, come
naturally to those who are trying hard to say things that are
true about it or, as we might say, “to get it right.” We could
expand this list of comparisons. Scarry writes that the
beautiful “prompts the mind to move chronologically back in
search for precedents and parallels, to move forward into new
acts of creation, to move conceptually over, to bring things into
relation.” 20 Wine perfectly exemplifies this feature of aesthetic
experience. Thus, Hugh Johnson writes, “Every bottle, every
glass of wine connects with bottles and glasses that went
before, leads back in memory, forward in anticipation and
sideways in reverie. The wines that really speak to me are
those that reverberate on more than just my tongue. Some
wines simply have more to say than others.” 21 Scarry writes
that perceiving beauty in things “seemed to bring them to life
or to make them lifelike.” She calls this feature a “mimesis of
life. […] the almost-aliveness of a beautiful object makes its
abrasive handling seem unthinkable.” 22 Nor has this feature of
wine gone unnoticed. Fadiman says, “Wine has a personality.
It is not dead matter.” 23 Julia Child describes wine as “a living
liquid” that has a life cycle. “When not treated with reasonable
respect it will sicken and die.” 24
Conclusion
When we think of the many things philosophers say in
characterizing beauty, perhaps especially the demands that
beauty can make on us as we try to appreciate it, we find that
wine possesses many of these same traits. We have argued
against claims that the objects we experience through taste
and smell are incapable of being beautiful, and we have
compared what philosophers say about conditions or
features of the beautiful with what authorities and
enthusiasts say about wine. We find the parallels striking, and
we take them to confirm an obvious point. If we can
experience beauty through taste and smell, then wine is an
ideal object for realizing this experience. Wine may be not
only an example of beauty but an exemplar of many of the
marks of the beautiful.
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the
Second International Conference on Philosophy and Wine,
San Francisco, April 2007 (reviewed in WFW 16, pp.21–23). 
Marks of the beautiful
If there is no distinction to be drawn between the higher and
lower senses that would imply as a matter of principle that
objects of taste cannot be beautiful, it remains to show that
wine is such an object. To do this, we will examine what some
philosophers who have written on beauty take to be marks of
the beautiful, and we will compare their claims to what
people who write about wine find natural to say. Now, this is a
crude, inductive method, to be sure; and to repeat a point we
made earlier, we know that wine lovers sometimes say things
that are wild exaggerations at best, and utter nonsense at
worst. We have tried to select passages from writers who wine
enthusiasts generally respect—that is, writers who are widely
regarded to possess whatever expertise the subject allows. 
The marks or features of the beautiful must enable us 
to distinguish judgments of beauty from claims about
experiences that we like or that are merely pleasing or
agreeable. One such mark is that objects we find beautiful
are those we tend to value for their own sakes or as ends, and
not merely as means for gaining pleasure or satisfaction.
Kant writes that a man who says that Canary wine is good
makes only a subjective judgment. He means, “It is
agreeable to me.” Kant goes on to insist that “the beautiful
stands on quite a different footing.” 11 Paraphrasing Kant’s
view, Richard Moran writes, “Our relation to the agreeable is
determined by, in the service of, our character as needy
human animals, whereas the pure judgment of taste, the
experience of something as beautiful, is independent both
of our more basic biological inclinations and of the rational
interests to which they gave rise.” 12 Another way to put this
point is to say that if we judge Canary wine to be good, we
mean merely that we like it. We say it is good because we like
it. With judgments of beauty, the fit is in the other direction.
We like what we find beautiful at least in part because we
judge the object to be valuable itself. Our liking is a
response to the value we perceive in the object of beauty. 
Nothing is more common among wine lovers than to
claim that their affection is a response to the wine itself.
Wine is collected and saved; it is to be appreciated under the
right circumstances and not merely to be used to enhance a
meal or, even more improbably, to quench a thirst. Matt
Kramer insists that “the great appeal of wine, the thing that
has sustained it as an object of unremitting attention from
millions of people over hundreds of years is precisely that it
offers us the opportunity to go beyond the bounds of I like
it/I don’t like it.” 13 A similar sentiment is expressed by 
Mike Steinberger, who concludes his description of a ’96
Coche Corton-Charlemagne with this comparison: “Think
of your favorite painting, or favorite novel, or favorite piece
of music—this was it in liquid form.” 14
Closely related to the idea that beautiful objects are
valued as ends or in their own right is the claim that the
beautiful, in contrast to the merely agreeable, demands a
certain response that we can call appreciation. This is in
contrast to what we merely desire, consume, or use up. One
of Scruton’s arguments is that taste and smell differ from the
higher senses because our enjoyment of what we taste and
smell typically involves consuming their objects. The
suggestion here is that what we value or find agreeable is the
sensation, not the object that causes it, so that the object
serves only as a means to producing pleasant or agreeable
experiences. The idea that beauty cannot require
consumption of its object, however, threatens also to rule out
kinds of music that essentially involve improvisation,
because the performance of such music is singular and non-
repeatable, thus non-enduring in the same way as the food 
or wine we consume. Or consider decisions, which may be
made for aesthetic reasons, to leave fragile works of art like a
fresco or a sculpture in their original settings, so that they
might be appreciated more fully. These decisions may also
imply that we will allow beautiful objects to decay or be
consumed in order that they may be appreciated. 
Perhaps the relevance of consumption to appreciation is
better made in a different way. Objects we consume for
enjoyment may fail to satisfy us, but beautiful objects make
demands on us that we may fail to meet. They bring to light
the possibility of our own inadequacies. Scarry writes that
“the experience of ‘being in error’ so inevitably accompanies
the perception of beauty that it begins to seem one of its
abiding structural features.” 15 Moran nicely puts the same
point as follows: “For it is when we are prepared to call
something beautiful that there is now logical room not
simply for disappointment in one’s experience, as there
might be with respect to any hoped-for source of pleasure,
but for disappointment in oneself rather than in the object,
for the various possibilities of failure of responsiveness.” 16
The possibility for error is familiar also to wine lovers.
They worry about failing a wine—for example, by drinking it
too young or by failing to appreciate it properly. Clifton
Fadiman writes as if he is demonstrating Moran’s point:
“Generally speaking, we demand something from hard
liquor: a punctual reaction. But we expect a wine of quality to
demand something from us: a slightly intensified exercise of
our senses, perhaps the endeavor of comparison, and finally
the crystallization of judgment.” 17
A third frequently mentioned mark of the beautiful is
that it makes us think. Beauty provokes deliberation and
reflection. In his argument relegating taste to the status of a
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